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Introduction 
Despite the fact that social theorists, if they become famous enough to warrant 
biography, are often happy to acknowledge the role of chance in their own lives they 
are not willing to include any role for chance in their theoretical accounts of other 
people’s actions and behaviour: in macro-theory, the idea that chance may on 
occasion be instrumental in effecting societal change has become, at least for 
theorists, a tacit taboo.  
This article challenges that taboo and advances an argument I am developing 
regarding the nature of societal change: contrary to the common belief that societal 
change proceeds by each new form of society supplanting the existing mode, I 
contend that societal change is accumulative. The grafting of layers of societal 
development does not follow any single logic. One influence upon the patterning of 
societal change has been chance, the unpopular subject of this article. To illustrate 
empirically the influence of chance in the process of accumulative societal 
development, in part one of this article I examine the historically important example 
of the rise by the British to paramountcy in Gujarat, now a State in northwestern 
India. It was at a Gujarati port that the first ship from the newly-formed East India 
Company dropped anchor, in Gujarat that the first Company factory was established, 
where the first Company men did business, learnt to negotiate with local powers, and 
where, in the same year but independent from Clive and far from the Calcutta 
bridgehead, the British ceased to be just merchant-adventurers  and started along the 
road that led to the Raj. This historical example affords an excellent test case for 
examining the nature of societal change and for inspecting what role, if any, may be 
played by chance. I show that chance had an undeniable presence in a sequence of 
events that will not fit into a ‘supplantist analysis’, no matter how Procrustean the 
analysis has been laid.  
A role for chance was not generally accepted by either the new British rulers of India 
nor by their subjects: 19th century historians, theologians, and oppositional political 
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groups opted, instead, for explanations that presented national or cultural features as 
causally responsible. Similarly, early social theorists shunned and suppressed chance, 
a tendency that persisted and which is still evident today: in the second part of this 
article I examine theoretically the subject of chance. I conclude that the conceptual 
ostracism of chance is not only empirically and methodologically unwarranted, it is 
also politically unwise.  
Part I: Bound for the East Indies 
The European spice trade, the midwife to British paramountcy in India, was the 
offspring of chance biodiversity. The high price paid by 17th century Europeans for 
spices such as cloves, nutmeg and pepper, and the exotic qualities attributed to these 
precious buds, nuts and berries, arose from the simple fact that they came from trees 
and plants that only flourished in far-away foreign soils. As John Keay, in his history 
of  the English East India Company (1991: 7), remarks: 
‘The perversity of nature in lavishing her most valued products on islands so small 
and impossibly remote prompted wonder and fable. To what Milton called the 
“islands of spicerie” an air of mystery clung.’ 
Also clinging to the mysterious Spice Islands (at that time, a name reserved for the 
volcanic Moluccan triangle), and already ensconced in the key  Sumatran and 
Indonesian trading centres, were Portuguese and Dutch merchants.  
The chief ambition of the East India Company, and the chief incentive for the 
Company’s financial backers, lay in importing the precious spices directly by sea 
from their islands of origin and thus avoiding the heavy charges levied by the 
Levantine  guilds and by other middlemen. The first and second Voyages of Company 
ships (1601-3 & 1604-6) confirmed the fabulous profits of such direct importation but 
they also revealed the local strengths of the Company’s Dutch rivals, the perils of the 
enterprise, and the greater trading value of Indian calicoes as compared to English 
goods. 
‘It was obviously advisable, therefore, to open up relations with Indian merchants, 
either on the Gujarat coast or (since that was understood to be dominated by the 
Portuguese) at Aden or the Red Sea ports, to which Indian trading ships freely 
resorted. Hopes were entertained that these merchants would be eager purchasers of 
English broadcloth and other manufactured goods; while the acquisition of calicoes 
for sale or barter eastwards would not only yield a double profit but would obviate the 
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necessity of exporting large quantities of money.’ (Foster, 1926: 1X-X) 
It was this trading strategy which set the course for the Company’s next (Third) 
Voyage, one of whose ships, the Hector, docked at Surat, then Gujarat’s premier port 
and entrepot, in August 1608. The Hector only remained at anchor for six weeks and 
it needed a further seven Voyages before the English Company was at last able to 
wrest a fragile Imperial firman (an edict) for a settled trading post, a ‘factory’, at 
Surat. 
The Company’s decision to make contact with Gujarati merchants had been based not 
only upon intelligence gathered from their own early Voyages, but also in the light of  
the region’s  already established  reputation. The European picture of Gujarat may 
have been scrappy and lacking map co-ordinates but it was, for mercantile strategy,  
sufficient: they knew that there was to be found a thriving, wealthy, trading entrepot  
well-suited to the Company’s purposes. Many of the reasons for the region’s wealth 
and trading prominence, which were of ancient standing, lay, once again, in chance 
geographical features.  
The area now comprising the State of Gujarat occupies the northern extremity of the 
western sea-board of India and is best understood as three adjoining areas: first, the 
barren, rocky, previously autonomous Kutch which contains two deserts, the big and 
little Ranns; second, the hilly Saurashtrian peninsula, largely scrub-land and forest; 
third, the mainland which, watered by sluggish rivers flowing down to the Arabian 
Sea, is in the main, a flat plain. The geographical position of Gujarat renders it the 
natural point of entry from the west through what is now Pakistan into the Ganjetic 
Plain, and the two gulfs defining the west and east sides of the Saurashtrian peninsula  
include natural harbours formed by estuaries. Unsurprisingly, this well-placed, 
comparatively fertile region, where nowhere is further than 100 miles from the coast, 
has long supported agriculture and trade.  
Chance geographical advantages have proved a mixed blessing for along with diverse 
traders, the region has also attracted the attention of foreign invaders. Following the 
defeat of the last Hindu Raj, in 1297, the region fell under the control of a succession 
of foreign powers. Initially a satellite province of the Delhi Sultanate, it was then an 
independent sultanate for a century and a half until a lightning raid of Mughal 
horsemen defeated the riven independent sultanate. In 1573 it was formally 
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incorporated as a subah (a province) of the Mughal Empire under the control of its 
viceroy, the subahdar – a post that quickly became a prized favour bestowed by the 
omnipotent Emperor, indeed in terms of prestige and income the key Imperial posting. 
As had his predecessors, the independent sultans, Akbar continued the custom of 
assigning lands to military leaders in payment of their contingent troops and the area 
was quickly divided between the leading powerful families (Gazetter, 1896: 209 & 
214). In the wake of the collapse of the Mughal Empire, in the early 18th century, 
local chiefs seized or re-established  principalities and the Gaekwad, the head of one 
of the Maratha clans that had previously been content to ransack the region and 
challenge the Mughal rulers on a seasonal basis,  took the town of Baroda as his new 
capital. As I have suggested elsewhere (1998), these successive episodes of foreign 
conquest - for which British rule, achieved in the early 19th century, was the final 
chapter - share some common characteristics.1 All the foreign invaders conquered and 
maintained their rule by military might; all were economically parasitic on the region, 
extracting taxes, cesses, rents, revenues, etc.; all the invaders worshipped alien gods 
but, despite campaigns of attempted conversion, prejudicial customs duties, razing of 
temples, and the like, none extinguished Hinduism which remained the religion of the 
majority of their subjects; all the invaders divided the region administratively, ruling 
directly the prosperous towns and ports whilst allowing local chiefs to continue ruling 
the remainder, the majority of the region, as long as they respected the conqueror’s 
ultimate sovereignty.2 This broad pattern of similarities, formalised bureaucratically 
by the British, suggests that the term ‘paramountcy’, usually reserved for the British 
rulers, could in the case of Gujarat be reasonably extended to cover all of the episodes 
of foreign rule under whose sway Gujaratis were subject for some seven and a half 
centuries until Independence.  
So far, I think, the role of chance, here simply a matter of the uneven global 
distribution of the sought-after spices and the lie of the land, is indisputably evident: 
perhaps banal, but still undeniable. But, whilst chance may have been a factor fuelling 
the mercantile adventure, did it play any part in steering the direction of subsequent 
historical development? 
The chance distribution of  plants in lands far from Europe lent mystique plus profit to 
spices and led European merchant-adventurers unexpectedly to Gujarat.  The local 
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conditions these merchants met with excited their curiosity and respect, for the 
thriving commercial centres well illustrated the sophistication of this ancient trading 
region. Nowadays, these same conditions excite historians and other social scientists, 
especially those with an interest in the ‘modernisation debate’ because, as Professor 
Mehta notes (1991: 11-12): 
‘There is a broad consensus among historians that Gujarat evolved cultural elements 
which distinguished it from most of the other regions of the Indian sub-continent. 
These elements could be identified and categorised as business culture. This was 
reflected during the Mughal period in an environment which the model-builders and 
practitioners of theory consider essential conditions.’   
Professor Mehta’s studies in Gujarati business history serve him to combat the 
Weberian thesis that ‘... the metaphysical and individualist world-view of the Hindus 
together with the social system that it perpetuated tended to retard the economic 
progress of India’ (1991: 15). In opposition to the Weberian thesis, Mehta seeks to 
show that the Hindu social system was quite flexible and supportive enough to permit 
some groups of Gujarati Hindus to prosper under Mughal and later British rule, 
sometimes achieving great wealth and influence and joining other outstanding 
Gujarati businessmen drawn from other locally practised faiths such as Jainism.3 
Although influence did accompany wealth, lending real privileges to newly-rich local 
businessmen, even the famous Jain magnate Shantidas Jawawahari, with his fabled 
jewellery and financial kingdom, could not rise higher than a ‘mayorship’: as the 
historian Commissariat (1957: 140), writing some thirty years before Professor 
Mehta, observed: 
‘The high social position he attained also helps to prove that the Hindu merchants and 
financiers of Gujarat during the 17th century, especially in the major towns of the 
province, enjoyed complete freedom to pursue their normal activities in trade and 
commerce, and to amass great wealth, even if they were debarred from the exercise of 
high political and administrative functions.’  
Not just individuals, nor just families, but also whole castes could rise on the wave of 
prosperity enjoyed by the commercial centres under Mughal rule; in particular, 
‘Banias’, a rendering of vaniya, the trading and commercial caste, thrived and were 
ubiquitous wherever profit could be turned in the subah of Gujarat. But, as with 
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individuals, their political significance was kept below their economic standing, a 
discrepancy that would reappear three centuries later as their descendants in Uganda 
found themselves scapegoated for the failures of Big Daddy Amin’s regime.        
‘Business culture’, whether inhibited or flourishing is not, however, in itself 
necessarily a promoter of societal change and the Gujarati caste, family or individual 
successes in business were achieved within conditions washed by the successive 
waves of foreign paramountcy: a further, more important, question to be asked in the 
‘modernisation debate’ is of course, Why did this seemingly ripe region not develop 
indigenous capitalistic commodity production? - a question which has generated 
exhaustive research and predictably conflicting answers,4  none of which are 
concerned with emphasising the purely chance factors that became influential in 
promoting industrial capitalist production in England, but not in Gujarat.     
Manufacture in pre-19th century Gujarat took place either in rural villages or in urban 
centres. In broad brushstroke, rural production was limited, followed traditional 
occupational caste specialisms and was geared largely to the villagers’ own 
subsistence needs. In the urban centres, in contrast, production was responsive to the 
demands of the ruling elites and the vibrant mercantile economy; indeed, the old 
Gujarati name for these urban centres, kasabas, means ‘crafts’( Desai, 1978: 23-24). 
Well known for textile manufacture, cotton spinning, and dyeing, Gujarat was also 
renowned for high quality silk, velvet, satin and other luxury cloths.  Much of this 
textile manufacture was commissioned by merchants or their agents who supplied 
capital in advance payments to the artisans, much like the European ‘putting-out’ 
system. In addition, the demands of the ruling elites and the merchants also supported 
ship-building, jewellers, indigo and saltpetre plants, and a host of other value-added 
forms of  production. Unsurprisingly, dynamic manufacture encouraged the growth of 
urban sophistication, sponsoring specific craft guilds, mahajans (intra-caste guilds 
regulating all aspects of  particular trades), finance houses, money lenders, and other 
assorted social formations. The largest urban centre, the de facto capital Ahmedabad, 
awed European visitors who, in their written accounts, noted the fine streets, 
impressive architecture, the pleasure garden, the sophisticated political structures and 
other features which rivalled major European cities such as London. 
One feature apparently missing in these impressive Gujarati manufacturing centres, 
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but commonplace in England and throughout Europe, was the water mill. The precise 
reasons for the absence of water mills in the region are difficult to fathom (as are the 
reasons for Europe’s slow adoption of the windmill), but one obvious culprit is the 
shortage of reliable, vigorous rivers in Gujarat; for there was no shortage of local 
skills, initiative or the materials to build mills. As with many other technologies, in 
Europe the water mill promoted new social roles and it also stimulated scientific 
inquiry (the question of whether the under-shot or over-shot water wheel was 
superior). And, of course, it powered the machinery of the Industrial Revolution until 
the advent of the steam engine, the single greatest improver of  production, whose 
significance was largely ignored by early theorists such as Adam Smith who, instead, 
overly concentrated upon the productive power of the division of labour.5 Even if 
Gujaratis had started along the path to competitive capitalist commodity production 
they would soon have been halted by the lack of a suitable power source. Labour-
power was, in Gujarat, only challenged in the second half of the 19th century (Mehta, 
1991: 128; Leadbeter, 1993: 29-32). By this time, Gujarat was a province of Her 
Majesty’s Empire and the British had been the paramount power for half a century. 
British paramountcy in Gujarat took some 50 years to establish and was effected by 
military conquest, usually in conjunction with wider military campaigns in other parts 
of India. A part of the reason for this change in the role of the English Company 
employees was what social theorists nowadays reflexively call an ‘unintended 
consequence of action’ but, as I will elaborate upon later, is better considered as a 
chance event. 
The East India Company, the world’s first joint-stock Company was established, with 
Elizabeth’s royal assent, to monopolise trade between Britain and the ‘east Indies’. 
From the outset, the Company was linked to sovereign and nation6 and by the 1760s it 
made the largest contribution to the Chancellor’s coffers. But, for the Directors and 
shareholders of the Company political ambition and colonial adventure were 
anathema: what they sought was a good, but not too risky, return on their investments 
and any action which threatened this pecuniary aim was prohibited. For some 70 or so 
years the Company took heed of the advice of their first ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, 
and his oft-quoted dictum - “ … if you will profitt, seek it at sea and in a quiett trade, 
for without controversy it is an errour to effect garrisons and land warrs in India.” 
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In 1668, the Company acquired the island of Bombay, for which they paid Charles II 
a nominal annual rent, and by 1688 it had become a sizable colony and the new site 
for the Presidency. This relocation had been occasioned by the need for a safer, 
defendable base for Company business in west India as Maratha raids upon Surat and 
elsewhere in Gujarat became more frequent and bloody. The English move prompted 
the start of a migration of Gujarati merchants and businessmen who joined the 
Company men on their new, insalubrious island fortress. Those that stayed behind 
could witness the decline of Surat7  as the collapse of  Mughal rule, following the 
death of Aurangzeb in 1717, ushered in a century of  dangerous instability. By the 
mid-18th century, the English were finding it almost impossible to trade profitably in 
Gujarat, either as agents for the Company or on their own behalf.8   
The reasons for this abrupt change in Company strategy, from a non-interventionist 
commercial strategy to involvement in local conflicts, fortress building and  
colonisation, are highly complex and varied from Presidency to Presidency (Brown, 
1995: 50-51). For the sake of this discussion, what is of interest is the chance 
invigoration of a disposition that enabled the English Company to maintain its trading 
presence in Gujarat and, eventually, to become paramount in the region and 
throughout India.  This advantageous disposition was the Company’s military 
standing which had arisen because of features of the trading world into which the 
Company had been launched in the 17th century. 
From the outset, the ships of the Company’s ‘Voyages’ had been armed and the 
Company men prepared to do battle. Part of the explanation for this military aspect to 
the Company’s business lay in European rivalry for the spice trade, a rivalry that not 
infrequently led to fighting at sea or at the centres of trade. Equally demanding of 
ordinance was the need to protect the cargoes carried to and from the ‘East Indies’. 
Initially, the Company Directors envisaged significant trading of commodities; in the 
case of Gujarat the aim of exchanging English goods for local produce such as 
saltpetre or indigo to be brought back to London, or Gujarati callicoes to be sold on, 
or exchanged for spices. Thwarting Company aims, this trading strategy proved naïve 
for there was a decidedly small market for heavy English woollens or iron in India 
and thus the Company was obliged to purchase, rather than trade for, Gujarati 
products.9 Similarly English attempts to establish their own industrial production, 
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attempting to circumvent local middlemen as they had Levantine merchants, 
floundered in the face of entrenched local labour politics (Commisariat, 1975: 
Chp.XXVII). Unable to trade or set-up their own production sites, the  Company was 
obliged to purchase goods which necessitated its ships carrying large quantities of 
bullion (usually, silver rials) across the high seas. Consequently the ships were rich 
pickings, both on their outward and return voyages and needed to be defended as did 
Company employees and Company investments in Gujarat and throughout the 
Company’s trading sphere. In addition, demonstrations of maritime military prowess 
persuaded the Emperor to allow the Company to maintain a factory at Surat. The 
Mughals were a wholly terrestrial power and were keen to play the English off against 
the Portuguese whom, at that time, were operating an extortion racket on shipping, 
including ships owned by members of the Mughal elite. Whereas on land the empire 
was well defended (Surat, eight miles up river from the estuary harbour, was a walled 
city under night-time curfew whose four entry gates were manned day and night by 
armed guards),  the Mughals’ lack or maritime power was a weakness exploited by 
the Portuguese. So, the Company’s 10th Voyagers’ defeat of a far stronger Portuguese 
fleet of  large galleons impressed greatly the Mughal general Sardar Khan who, along 
with a crowd of onlookers, witnessed the sea battle and was quick to convey news of 
this rout to his Emperor. In his memoir Nicholas Withington records that ‘this fight 
being before thowsands of the countrye people, who (to our nation’s greate fame) 
have divulged the same farre and neare.’10    As their nation’s prestige rose following 
this battle so too did the Company’s, and having established themselves in the region, 
the Company were to find guns and arms indispensable in the volatile region: when, 
in 1664, the Maratha forces plundered Surat for 40 days, only the Mughal Governor’s 
castle and the English Factory resisted. 
From the earliest days, then, armaments were an integral part of the traders’ repertoire 
and an essential lever upon Mughal politics. But aside from the aberrant, ill-judged, 
and short-lived actions by Sir John Child against the Mughals in 1686, the Company 
did not enter into any campaign that would have gone against Roe’s cautionary 
dictum. When, in the mid-18th century, trading conditions had become fraught in 
Gujarat it was all groups of traders who suffered, not just the English. So bad had 
conditions become that, in 1758, the Surati merchants forsook the old order, a city 
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ruled by an independent Nawab,  in favour of a European protectorate and, having 
chosen the English over the Dutch  they ‘… offered to finance the take-over by the 
British of the Surat citadel. After considerable hesitation, the British made the 
requested move and, in March 1759, the citadel fell into their hands.’ (Torri, 1982: 
268; and see Bruce Watson, 1978).  For the next forty years, Surat was jointly-
governed, by the Nawab and the British until, in 1800, the Nawab was pensioned-off.  
Under joint-rule, under protection of English weaponry, Surat became a 
comparatively stable, peaceful and prosperous oasis in a turbulent region. That the 
English were instrumental in watering this oasis, and maintaining a presence in the 
region in which, after the defeat of the contending Marathas, they would become the 
paramount power, was crucially dependent upon their military strength. This strength 
is, then, the candidate for a disposition which was triggered by the demands of the 
Surati merchants who found themselves vulnerable in the wake of the collapse of   
Mughal rule in Gujarat.  These demands, which triggered the disposition, had no 
connection to the rationale for the Englishers’ military might. 
Part II: The Very Unwelcome Guest 
There are, of course, many other instances of chance playing her part in the two-and-
a-half centuries that had started with the first British ship docking at an Indian port 
and ended with them starting to rule the subcontinent. The examples of chance 
highlighted in the foregoing discussion - chance biodiversity, chance technological 
differentials and chance British military strength -  have been chosen so as to 
examine, later in this second Part, two, highly rare, modern theories of chance, not 
because they are necessarily more noteworthy than other candidates of chance 
occurrence during this period.  I am, most emphatically, not arguing that chance - as 
illustrated in these examples - was the cause of British paramountcy in Gujarat, and 
nor am I claiming that chance always intervened in the patterning of  this historical 
episode. (Indeed, in another case of comparative technological developments, I 
myself have argued elsewhere, (1996), that the slow adoption of the printing press in 
Gujarat, with all its attendant societal consequences, was because of  pre-existing 
local cultural factors  that acted as predictable inhibitors to the adoption of print 
technology).  Rather, I think, the question to be answered is:  How can chance 
influences be distinguished, and then accommodated within a theory of societal 
change? 
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The most common practice, from all sides, has been simply to discount chance 
altogether. This blanket dismissal characterised the contemporaneous reception of 
chance as historians, political spokesmen and religious leaders sought to explain 
India’s subjection to a handful of English ‘hatmen’. Clearly, the notion that the 
British had, to some extent, been plain lucky, was not the sorts of narrative feature 
that appealed to Imperialist historians. Looking back upon the exploits of the first 
Englishmen in India Philip Anderson (1856: 5), an historian and Chaplain in the 
service of the East Company stationed on Bombay, found little to admire: 
‘In writing the word “Empire” we are reminded how ill it assorts itself with the facts 
which are here to be recorded. The word conveys ideas of grandeur, wealth and 
power; whereas as this and the following two chapters are annals of mediocrity and 
weakness: sometimes of drivelling baseness. The instruments which Providence 
employed to create a British power in India were often of the basest metal. But such 
answer the same purpose as the finest, in the hands of Infinite Wisdom. And though 
we may feel disappointed, we ought not to be surprised, when we see little to admire 
in the Pioneers of the Eastern Empire, and find that some were amongst the meanest 
of mankind. 
Yet, bad as were such agents, it will, I think, appear in this work that British power 
has been established by the force of British character.’ 
Anderson’s ungenerous assessment of the early ‘pioneers’, penned in the mid-
nineteenth century, may have found favour with his fellow countrymen for the 
behaviour of their forebears in Gujarat was out of keeping with the exalted image that 
the British now gilded their histories. In common with many other historians and 
social scientists, Anderson mistook precursors for progenitors: mistakenly, he saw the 
forerunners of the British Raj as being its begetters. In contradistinction to the 
Reverend historian, we might note that, rather than the superior ‘force of British 
character’, it was actually the character of British armed forces that proved pivotal in 
pre-Raj Gujarat. And, just as sordid military aspects to the Company’s involvement in 
India were unacceptable to nineteenth century nationalistic sensibilities, so too was 
the notion that the English had, on occasion, been plain fortunate: the eventual rise of 
the British to paramountcy may have been providential, but it was not ordained by 
Providence.  
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Identifying mysterious forces which led to the eventual triumph of the British was not 
a sport confined to Victorian Company historians: on the obverse side Mahatma 
Gandhi, Gujarat’s most famous son, offered his supporters a mirror image of  
Anderson’s explanation only now it was the degeneracy of  the ‘Indians’ which 
allowed them to be conquered by an ignoble race of  ‘shop-keepers’: 
‘The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India 
because of their strength, but because we keep them. [...] They came to our country 
originally for purposes of trade. Recall the Company Bahadur. Who made it Bahadur? 
They had not the slightest intention at the time of establishing a kingdom. Who 
assisted the Company’s officers? Who was tempted at the sight of their silver? Who 
brought their goods? History testifies that we did all this. In order to become rich all 
at once we welcomed the Company’s officers with open arms.’ (1993: 15)  
Just as Anderson essentialised the British by their common national ‘character’ so too 
Gandhi essentialised ‘Indians’, signalled by his use of the common pronoun and by 
his claim of a common national character failing, the greed of ‘we Indians’ that had 
given the British their country on a plate. In fact, at the time the British rose to 
paramountcy, at the time the country was supposedly first handed over to the white 
traders, neither an homogenous ‘India’ nor ‘Indians’ existed; both were a creation of  
Imperial conquest. In reality a common Gujarati identity only appeared alongside a 
wider Indian identity that itself arose during the 19th century in opposition to the 
British. Gujarat, like many other areas of the subcontinent, had always been home to a 
hugely diverse, fluctuating population of varied cultures, religions and histories: even 
within the majority Hindu population the divisions were legion and Gujarat has long 
been known as the ‘land of castes’. Those who ‘assisted the Company’s officers’, 
were ‘tempted by the sight of their silver’, or ‘bought their goods’ were far too varied 
to be caught within Gandhi’s self-flagellating common pronoun: this specious 
commonality, which ignores the skeins of power and influence in ‘India’, no more 
explains the rise of the Raj than does Anderson’s religious chauvinism.    
Lastly social scientists who, in common with Anderson and Gandhi, came to stress 
defining essences of Oriental and Occidental cultures, essences that prohibited or 
permitted the progressive development of modernism. Their reasons for the dismissal 
of chance, and the related success of the ‘supplantist’ model of societal development, 
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are many and complex but figuring chief amongst them was the growth of scientism 
and the accompanying elevation of methodology over discovery. This unfortunate 
trend towards scientism is evident in the opening sentence of Montesquieu’s well-
known and influential Enlightenment tome, revealingly entitled The Spirit of the 
Laws: 
‘Laws, taken in their broadest meanings, are the necessary relations deriving from the 
nature of things; and in this sense, all beings have their laws: the divinity has its laws, 
the material world has its laws, the intelligences superior to man have their laws, the 
beasts have their laws, man has his laws. 
Those who have said that a blind fate has produced all the effects that we see in the 
world have said a great absurdity; for what greater absurdity is there than a blind fate 
that could have produced intelligent beings?’ (1979: 3)  
Montesquieu’s respect for laws was, by the time that his book was published (1756), 
shared by many of the progressive Enlightenment philosophes as they battled against 
irrational prejudice and superstition. For Enlightened Christians such as Montesquieu 
unwilling to forsake their religion, the new challenges to their faith from science and 
the mechanistic weltanschauung threw them into the deist camp – God became a new 
sort of law-giver.  It seemed but a logical step to apply the methodology of natural 
science to the social world: Adam Smith’s establishment of the first accepted social 
science rested upon his apparent importing of science’s alleged hallmark, explanation 
through laws, into political economy, a methodological strategy later attempted by 
Durkheim for sociology.11
Alongside this emphasis upon law-like explanation, nineteenth century foundational 
sociology was also informed by an eighteenth century view, championed by Smith 
and others from the Scottish School, that distinguished stages of progressive societal 
development. Each of these progressive, historical stages supplanted its predecessor, 
capitalism, for instance, supplanting feudalism, mercantilism, or whatever. By chance 
misfortune, this commonly-held ‘supplantist view’ became recast within an 
evolutionary framework before a credible theory of natural evolution had appeared. In 
this sense, then, the Comtean hierarchy of the sciences was premature for at the time 
that the christener of the discipline was writing, biology was still in its infancy, too 
immature to spawn sociology, too young to deserve methodological emulation. 
                                                                         
 
14
Nonetheless, societal evolutionism became entrenched within sociology, and in 
Hegelian guise within Marxian societal theory.  
The failure to discern any laws of society, any sociological laws, eventually saw off 
the pretensions of Positivism but the assumptions of  societal change accomplished by 
supplantism and the related belief that societal change was evolutionary in character 
persisted; having crossed the Atlantic, societal evolutionism became a mainstay of 
American macro sociology and was still being advocated by Talcott Parsons in the 
mid-1960s (1966). Meanwhile, sociology’s allegedly sister discipline, biology, 
enjoyed acclaim and prestige following Darwin’s version of natural evolution. What 
was noteworthy about biology’s disciplinary success was the fact that it was not 
founded upon the discovery of a new law but, rather, upon the identification of the 
mechanism that facilitated evolution, a mechanism that showed, contrary to 
Montesquieu’s scornful pronouncement, how ‘blind fate’ could indeed lead to the 
creation of intelligent beings without the need for a divine law-giver nor a belief in 
progressive development. 
A century and a half on, and notwithstanding the extraordinary advances built upon 
Darwin’s arguments, it is still not possible for social theorists to borrow their picture 
of societal development from the methodology of evolutionary biology and nor is it 
possible, at present, for us to turn to evolutionary biology for empirical support in 
identifying chance influences. The reason for this disciplinary methodological barrier 
is partly one of logic. The logical objection to social theorists drawing a 
methodological parallel between societal and Darwinian evolution concerns the 
special nature of Darwin’s explanatory mechanism. In bald summary, my argument 
against this methodological ploy runs as follows: the only credible explanation for 
natural evolution is Darwin’s; what distinguishes this explanation is his identification 
of the mechanism that permits both continuity and discontinuity between species and 
which also accounts for adaptive change. In order for this explanatory logic to 
operate, phenotypic features must be either preserved or lost. Natural selection 
involves natural loss: no loss, no evolution. Despite delusory appearances, the 
development of what Popper referred to as ‘World 3’ (artefacts and customs created 
by humans), is not evolutionary because past achievements are most usually 
preserved; a trend strengthened dramatically by Gutenberg. The artificial world, a 
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major influence upon the expression of the human phenotype, is, then, built by 
grafting new layers upon the past.12
The old evolutionary picture of societal change, wherein a newly emerging form of 
society will come to supplant its predecessor, is still the palimpsest for many 
contemporary writers of social theory. So, for illustration, both ‘postmodernists’ and 
‘globalisationists’ claim, often dramatically, that we are entering a distinctively new 
age that will sweep aside earlier versions of societal organisation. From the 
‘accumulative’ perspective, however, these and similar claims are viewed as 
erroneous for, unlike phenotypic features that cannot be restored by the individual 
when once lost to natural selection, earlier features of the artificial world are routinely 
preserved within the contemporary manifestation and may be redeployed if 
circumstances demand. For example, neither innovative technologies nor novel social 
organisations supplant predecessors: when television sets became a mass acquisition 
it was feared, wrongly, that the wireless and conversation would be extinguished; this 
did not occur and nor will the Internet vanquish other forms of communication. Some 
earlier forms of communication may fall into disfavour, they may reside only in 
museums, but they are not, properly speaking, extinct: ticker-tape machines (and soon 
probably Faxes), may no longer be manufactured but, unlike Dodos, they easily could 
be in the future. Similarly, the nation state was built upon earlier forms of 
collectivism and collectivist sentiments such as tribalism and religious communalism; 
these earlier forms are preserved, not lost, and when the state is disturbed these 
dormant features may be reawoken, as has happened so sadly in the former Eastern 
bloc countries and elsewhere. Societal innovation adds to our repertoire, it does not 
eliminate the social past. 
Curiously, and perhaps contrary to expectations, current evolutionary biology does 
offers some intriguing empirical and theoretical purchase upon the roles chance plays 
in affecting behaviour. These insights come not from sociobiology, nor from its 
sibling evolutionary psychology, but from the rather different focus of behavioural 
genetics. Unlike sociobiologists, behavioural geneticists are concerned largely with 
distinguishing environmental and genetic reasons for variation among groups of 
individuals. The most common research methodologies are twin studies and adoption 
studies, taking advantage of large data sets held in several countries, and the known 
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genetic similarity of siblings, fraternal and identical twins.  Behavioural geneticists 
have examined a wide variety of values and behaviours and their findings ‘have been 
characterized by both excitement and controversy’ (Sherman et al, 1997), in 
particular because of the repeated claim that while genes are an important source of  
variation, as are unique environmental factors, the shared environment has negligible 
influence.  
A number of  texts written for the non-scientist have brought behavioural genetics to 
the attention of the wider public,13 among which one of the most notable has been 
Steven Pinker’s account of Judith Harris’s reanalysis of  the evidence that parents 
have a long-term effect on the development of their children’s personality. Harris’s 
much debated conclusion had been that it was socialisation outside the home, 
especially within peer groups, that accounted for the variations found in adult siblings 
(1995 & 1998). In their explanations for individual development pathways, Harris and 
Pinker part company for unlike Harris, Pinker suggests that it may be chance 
individual genetic development and the chance ‘filling of niches in peer groups’ 
which explains observable variations (2002: 396-397). Interestingly, Harris’s 
objections to Pinker’s advocacy of chance determinants stem from her adherence to 
an evolutionary psychological methodology which leads her to balk at the prospect of 
admitting random influence into the explanatory equation: for Harris, even if we do 
admit the possibility of random, individual chance developments in the personalities 
of children we can still submit the effects of these idiosyncrasies to the logic of 
evolutionary psychology.14 It would, I think, be fair to note that Harris’s response to 
chance reflects an overarching tendency within Darwinian analyses to regard all 
outcomes as the accountable products of selective pressures – a tendency which once 
again neuters chance’s explanatory role. One unexpected belief shared by religious 
thinkers, by sociobiologists and by evolutionary psychologists, is that change follows 
an ordained pattern, either God’s or Darwin’s.    
This disciplinary resistance to chance, the reluctance to admit the salience of random 
individual differences, was encountered by the eminent American psychologist 
Professor David Lykken. Using the Minnesota twin data, Lykken (1993) investigated 
mate selection and concluded that ‘it is romantic infatuation that commonly 
determines the final choice [of a mate] from a broad field of potential eligible and that 
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this phenomenon is inherently random’, and not patterned in accordance with genetic 
similarities. The implications of this study for evolutionary biology and psychology, 
and for romantics, are obvious and profound, and supportive of this article’s 
insistence that chance colours our social world, but the research remains 
unsubstantiated  because no follow-up studies have been published.15  One reason for 
the absence of corroborating findings may well be the general aversion of 
psychologists to the suggestion that it is chance which rules the all-important question 
of  which genes are transmitted from one generation to the next: as Professor Lykken 
observes, ‘Psychologists have always assumed that romantic attachment follows 
reasonably orderly rules and they have built books and careers on debate about what 
those rules are.’16 Unsurprisingly, given this disciplinary aversion to chance, to the 
notion that human mating is, in Lykken’s phrase, ‘adventitious’, the Professor met 
with stiff opposition to the publication of his article which was eventually accepted 
for publication because of the robustness of the data he presented in favour of his 
adventitious analysis. 
I have suggested that because of insuperable logical barriers we cannot use  
Darwinian methodology to explain societal development, and that the current state of 
evolutionary biology can offer only promising, but inconclusive support for the 
argument that chance affects our behaviour and personalities. The disagreement 
between Harris and Pinker, and the reception given to Lykken’s study all point to the 
deeply held hostility felt by academics towards chance, a cold-shouldering also 
encountered by sociologists who trespass outside disciplinary boundaries.  
 There have been very few theoretical treatments of the topic in British sociology: two 
exceptions to this general neglect are Mike Smith (1993) and  Roger Sibeon (1999),  
both of whom argue, in differing ways, for an acceptance by  theorists that chance is 
not simply a residual analytical category, nor an ignorable aspect of social life. Smith 
and Sibeon are, however, exceptions to the general  tacit silence on the subject and 
Smith’s own account of his difficulties in publishing a discussion on chance echo 
Professor Lykken’s and appears to confirm Raymond Boudon’s  judgement that: 
‘In the social sciences, chance is generally thought to be a very unwelcome guest, 
ubiquitous but studiously concealed, ignored and even denied the right to exist by 
virtually everyone.’ (1986: 173)   
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In his discussion of theories of societal change, Boudon  extends an invitation to this 
awkward exile:  what, in my view,  distinguishes Boudon’s  discussion is his 
insistence that: 
‘… we must see chance not as a substance, a variable or a set of variables, but as a 
structure which is characteristic of certain sets of causal chains as perceived by an 
observer.’ (1986: 179)  
This structural conceptualisation of chance rests upon the logic of the ‘Cournot 
Effect’, for which Boudon cites one of  Cournot’s own illustrative examples: 
‘Cournot, of course, illustrated the idea by means of a very simple example, such as 
that of a falling slate stunning a passer-by. The fall of the slate was certainly 
predetermined. It was not properly fastened on the roof and was at the mercy of the 
slightest gust of wind. The fact that the passer-by was walking just below the roof was 
also the result of an easily traceable causality. He was going about his business that 
day as on any other day and was thus bound to pass below the roof in question. So we 
are dealing here with two causal series. The fact that they converge, however, is 
according to Cournot, not causally determined, since there was nothing to make the 
slate fall just as the man was passing.’  
In Boudon’s opinion, the use of such ‘simple explanatory examples’ suggests that ‘the 
field of application of the concept is not very well understood’: to illustrate properly 
the ‘field of application’ within social theory Boudon re-presents Colas’s study of 
Lenin, arguing Colas demonstrates that the revolutionary leader’s political actions and 
doctrines can only be understood fully  if the influences of  Cournot Effects are 
admitted. 
In the conclusion to his treatment of the topic Boudon states that: 
‘Chance is therefore not nothing. It is a particular form that sets of cause/effects 
linkings as perceived by a real observer can take on.’  
This introduction of an emphasis upon a ‘real observer’ may be slightly misleading: in 
the quoted example of the slate falling from the roof, if we substitute first a passing 
dog, and then a sprouting plant for the ‘passer-by’ then the Cournot Effect still occurs 
- but without the need for a ‘real’ observer. Chance is a feature of the world, not a 
product of human observation.  Furthermore, if we re-examine the example of the 
falling slate, then it seems less plausible that its fall was ‘predetermined’: rather, the 
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poor workmanship of the tiler had left it with a disposition that was made effective by 
the strong gust of wind. Rather than the ‘sets of cause/effects linkings’ of which 
Boudon writes, we might instead reconceptualise the linkings as one of dispositions 
actuated by chance. Recast in this format, Boudon’s presentation of Cournot Effects 
captures nicely the turn of events in Surat in 1759: British military prowess arose 
because of an accountable sequence of demands associated with Company trading 
(the need to protect cargoes and bullions, the political advantages arms afforded in 
Mughal Gujarat, etc.); when political conditions deteriorated in the wake of the 
Mughal Empire’s collapse this military prowess was sought by local traders, and thus 
a disposition unconnected with this collapse became activated. This event can 
reasonably be seen as an example of the Cournot Effect.   
One temptation may be to imagine that the unexpected significance of British military 
strength could be subsumed under the label of ‘unintended consequences of action’: 
certainly, it had not been the intention of Company directors, nor of their employees, 
that they would move to rule and administer Gujarati cities when the Mughal empire 
expired. However, this is not what lent the events of 1759 their chance character. 
Whereas all examples of this kind of chance event may be unintended, by no means 
all unintended consequences of action equate with chance. Intentionality requires 
foresight, and no one in this example did, or could have, foreseen the opportunity that 
their military standing would bring. In the workings of a Cournot Effect, the effect is 
unpredictable, a commonly specified aspect of chance and one that Aristotle 
emphasised. Aristotle, keen to establish the causal connections between events, 
arrived at a theory of chance almost identical to Cournot’s and he argued that it was 
simply a matter of when something happened, not how, that was key. Chance events 
were not special or mysterious, rather, they were exceptional and unpredictable (Ross, 
1988: 77-80).  
It would be unreasonable to presume that there is a defining ‘essence’ of chance; as 
with any other similar category, chance phenomena share Wittgenstein’s ‘family 
resemblance’ of similarities and differences (Wittgenstein, 1983: Rs 65-67). An 
alternative sibling form of chance events, and the mechanism by which they may 
operate is explored by Jared Diamond in his provocatively subtitled Short History of 
Everybody For The Last 13,000 Years. Eschewing any form of genetic determinism, 
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the evolutionary biologist and biogeographer Jack Diamond greatly expands an 
argument he had outlined previously in his non-technical account of human evolution. 
Guns, Germs and Steel addresses the question: ‘Why did history unfold differently on 
different continents?’ to which Diamond answers: ‘History followed different courses 
for different peoples because of differences among people’s environments, not 
because of biological differences among peoples themselves’ (1998: 25).  As 
Diamond recognises,  this type of answer, this sort of analytical approach,  has itself a 
long pedigree (Montesquieu’s ‘theory of the climates’ springs to mind) but, 
nonetheless, recent findings in a number of  scientific disciplines merits a revival of 
the approach that had fallen into disfavour amongst professional historians.   
Diamond’s specific arguments are contentious17 and the details need not detain us but, 
where I feel he succeeds is in revealing the influences of topographical, geographical 
and biodiverse ‘environmental’ factors on human development, technological and 
societal. The extent of this influence is debatable, but Diamond presents a plausible 
case for a degree of influence that accounts for different patterns of societal change, a 
plausible case that avoids the charge of  ‘environmental determinism’. Using many, 
many examples, Diamond shows how variations in environments, in for instance the 
lie of the land, or the indigenous animal populations, affected our ancestors’ abilities 
to migrate, domesticate livestock, etcetera. These environmental variations were, of 
course, the product of chance; beyond our ancestors’ control. The effects of such 
chance factors gave, in Diamond’s view, advantages or disadvantages that became 
apparent when groups of our ancestors came into contact;  they go some way to 
explaining why some of these groups, and not others,  became conquerors and why 
some human populations remained technologically stagnant. Again, here it is the 
timing of chance which lends it gravity: first encounters between cultures possessing 
differing advantages only happen once and in a particular way; it is this unrepeatable 
specificity that may prove decisive for shaping their mutual history.18  If  watermills 
had been established in Gujarat at the time when European traders stimulated demand 
for local products then perhaps it might have been Gujarati manufacture that first 
became mechanised and perhaps later, steam engines would not have had to be 
imported to Bombay from England. 
More than a nice riposte to genetic determinism, Diamond’s study also illustrates the 
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analytical possibilities of chance as a subject not defined simply as the Cournot 
Effect. Unlike in the Gujarati example of a Cournot Effect when local conditions 
unexpectedly gave new significance to British military standing, the international 
distribution of indigo, saltpetre, pepper, opium and the rest of the desirable 
commodities to be found in the ‘East Indies’ had nothing to do with expectations or 
intended actions: it was not an action at all, nor an event. The natural pattern of 
unequal distribution was a given fact and it  was this chance fact that provoked 
resourceful speculative capitalists living in 17th century London to arrange for 
hazardous importation from another continent. That it was the British who went to 
Surat, rather than Gujaratis to London, cannot be explained solely by nature’s 
capriciousness but nonetheless such natural variations of soil and climate were the 
chance precursor of the Company’s voyages. It would be possible to label such 
natural chance patterning as a ‘necessary but not sufficient condition’ for the events 
that unfolded – a chance necessary but not sufficient condition.         
Why bother with chance? 
I have tried, in this article, to examine the subject of chance using empirical examples 
drawn from an important historical episode. I have indicated that the neglect of 
chance is not confined to sociology or social theory but is also to be found in some 
areas of evolutionary biology. There are some supporting findings from behaviour 
genetics but as in social science, the disciplinary door is currently closed to the 
‘unwelcome guest’. In social science, Enlightenment legacies promoted the 
supplantist model of societal change and the accompanying belief in societal 
evolution; these legacies became part of the theorists’ vocabulary as did the 
smothering of chance. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the usual exclusion policy 
and Jared Diamond’s and Raymond Boudon’s work shows us how chance may be 
recognised and incorporated within theoretical analyses of societal change. I have 
pointed out that facts and events we recognise as chance are not defined by an essence 
of chanciness and that the examples from Gujarat, and Diamond’s and Boudon’s 
theoretical analyses of such examples, are directed towards different forms of chance 
that played different sociological roles and so demand different theoretical treatment. 
Clearly, there is a lot more that needs to be done in this area; other forms of chance 
need to be distinguished as do the theories that would accommodate them. Which 
begs the question: what is to be gained from readmitting the ‘unwelcome guest’? One 
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answer to this question is to examine the alternative. If we continue to shun chance 
then we are open to the inflation of causality and we court determinism. In a picture 
of societal change which excludes chance all events are likely to be presented as 
causally determined: the danger emerges that causality, faithful to its etymological 
origin, leads to blame – individuals, classes, social groups, or whomever, become 
morally liable for their chance societal development. At the individual level, a failure 
to acknowledge chance influences may lead one to exaggerate one’s own qualities as 
causally responsible for what was in fact a fortuitous turn of events: for example, a 
British Prime Minister might think that he is personally responsible for his Party’s 
electoral successes, that it was his qualities and boyish charm that brought a landslide 
victory, whereas the reality may be that the electorate would have voted for anybody 
who was not a member of the detested opposition. The advantages that may be gained 
by accepting the operation of chance in societal affairs are political as well as 
analytical. In the example of the British rise to paramountcy, if this is viewed as 
simply the outcome of causal characteristics of  ‘British’ or ‘Indian’ cultures then 
inevitably the membership of  both these two cultures, Britishers and Indians, become 
morally judged and liable in terms of  historical outcome. And this was exactly what 
did, and does, happen in the case of Britain’s Imperial rule of India. If, instead, we 
explicitly recognise that this outcome was in part the product of chance occurrences 
then we don’t prohibit sociological explanation, but we do discourage the wrong-
headed attribution of responsibility for events that emerged for both chance and 
sociologically deterministic reasons. The British rise to paramountcy in Gujarat was 
not an evolutionary step and nor did British culture supplant the indigenous ways; 
instead, it should be seen as a further accumulated crust upon our mutual history; a 
crust which hardened partly by chance. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 The exception to this pattern is the short-lived Gaekwad’s period of paramountcy, 
for the Maratha clan of which he was the leader were Hindus. In all other respects, 
however, this Maratha paramountcy conformed to the pattern followed by the other 
foreign conquerors. 
2 In this administrative bisection under the independent sultans the crown domain 
administered directly was known as the khalsah. For the disturbing complexities of  
land ownership, taxation and administration in Gujarat, and those specific to the 
villages, see Gazetter, 1896: 208-228. 
3 Similarly Jack Goody has used Gujarat as a case study with which to examine 
critically the key assumptions of the Weberian paradigm (Goody, 1991) 
4 Particularly important contributions to this debate include Habib, 1969 and Gopal,  
1975. 
5 As a member of the illustrious ‘Glasgow College’, Adam Smith knew well the 
University’s ‘Instrument Maker’, James Watt. Watt’s personal opposition to the 
smaller-sized, more powerful, and hence more versatile, high-pressure steam engine  
blinded him to the invention’s dramatic future. Donald Cardwell remarks: 
‘If Watt failed to foresee the future it is also surprising that Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations 
(1776), makes no reference at all to steam engines, much less to the radically improved version that his 
young colleague had invented.’  (Cardwel1, 1994:167) 
One possible reason for Smith’s myopia may be that by the time he published his 
Wealth of Nations, he had already harboured the notion that the division of labour is 
the greatest cause of  productive improvement for some twenty years (the idea first 
appears in his Lectures on Jurisprudence).   
6 On the early links between the Company, the Crown and nation, see: Chaudhuri, 
1965:29-31. 
7 The extent of this decline is open to question: see Das Gupta, 1979.  
8 Although always forbidden by the Company, ‘private trading’ was rife amongst its 
employees: for the influence of this illegitimate business on  Company policy in 
Gujarat, see Nightingale’s important study, 1970. 
9  The low demand for English products also hampered attempts by Company 
employees to bribe Mughal officials. One way round this problem was to offer novel 
bribes, then called ‘toys’: this strategy was particularly important for the higher-ups in 
the Mughal hierarchy  and especially for the Emperor himself whose fabulous wealth 
made any ordinary gift appear tawdry.  
10 Nicholas Withington returned home in chains accused, perhaps wrongly, of 
embezzlement following an appalling misadventure as an agent of the Company in 
Gujarat. His account, an attempt to clear his name, and other collected memoirs for 
this Voyage are to be found in: W. Foster (Ed.), 1934.  
11  Keen to champion French thinkers against the then prevailing fashion for British 
and German theorists Durkheim, in his minor Latin thesis, presented Montesquieu as 
the true founder of social science: ‘It was he, who, in The Spirit of Laws, laid down 
the principles of the new science’, a science brought to maturity in Durkheim’s view 
by Comte.  (Durkheim, 1965).  
12 This argument is sketched, for a different discussion in: J. Mattausch, 2000. 
13 For example, D. Hamer & P. Copeland, 1998. 
14 Author’s correspondence with Judith Harris.  
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15 To my knowledge the only follow-up to Lykken’s study is a critical response, 
presented as a yet unpublished conference paper (Rushton, 2003).  
16  Author’s correspondence with Professor Lykken. 
17 In particular, Diamond’s well-meant claim that Polynesians exhibit greater 
intelligence than Europeans is not only implausible, it also replicates in obverse 
fashion the old Eurocentric arguments he so strongly opposes.  
18  A broadly similar influence is recognised in physics where it is known as 
‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ (see for example the discussion in Ruelle, 1993: 
Chp.7). Because in societal development such initial influences are unrepeatable, 
because they never reoccur, they cannot be captured within ‘risk’ analysis.   
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